What is HexOS threat model for curated Application?

[NAS]

HexOS needs to establish a threat model with their curated applications and communicate that to the community. What kind of threats could we face based on how an application is being used and exposed to the network?

Use Case 1: Exposing an Application to the WAN (Public Access)

Threats:

1. External Attackers: Malicious actors may exploit vulnerabilities in the application, potentially allowing unauthorized access.
2. DDoS Attacks: Distributed Denial of Service attacks could overwhelm the application and its associated infrastructure.
3. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks: Attackers could intercept communications between users and the application.
4. Misconfigured Security Measures: Vulnerabilities arising from misconfigured HexOS firewall rules or other security protocols could expose internal services.

Use Case 2: Exposing Services Through LAN Only

Threats:

1. Internal Threats: Malicious users or compromised devices within the LAN pose risks to security.
2. Exploitable Configurations: Poor application setups or vulnerabilities could be exploited by other trusted users or devices.
3. Lateral Movement Risks: A compromised endpoint within the LAN could facilitate lateral movement to access other internal services.

Challenges in Mitigation

Some threats are difficult to mitigate effectively:

• DDoS Attacks: When executed well, these attacks are challenging to block and often require upstream infrastructure beyond HexOS to manage effectively.
• Firewall Configuration: While HexOS firewalls can be configured to improve security, managing upstream infrastructure, such as routers or dedicated firewalls, falls outside the scope of HexOS documentation.

My Recommendations

Users may need to expose certain applications only through the WAN (for external VPN access or public access) while limiting others to the LAN. It is crucial to recognize that the LAN should not be treated as a trusted network, as other services can be compromised, serving as a foothold for further intrusions. The following recommendations can help enhance security, depending on backend implementations designed to protect users:

Application Isolation

• Deploy applications in separate virtual or physical environments (e.g., using containers or separate Virtual Private Clouds).
• Restrict outbound and inbound traffic to only the necessary connections for application functionality, applying the principle of least privilege.

Access Control

• Implement strong authentication and authorization mechanisms (e.g., OAuth, API keys) to ensure that only legitimate users can access the system.

Traffic Encryption

• Utilize HTTPS to encrypt data in transit, safeguarding against MitM attacks.
• Implement VPN gateways that can securely manage encrypted traffic for sensitive operations.

Many of these thoughts mention here come from seeing some open source projects like casaos and cosmos-server that have mitigated some of these security threats. 

I'm sure Hex OS can provide even better experience if they lay the proper groundwork now.  That ground work starts with the egress and structuring templates for applications.

Edited February 27 by NAS

[NAS]

If I were to sum it up HexOS should operate under the principle that applications are not not be trustworthy and build out their infrastructure accordingly.

Edited February 27 by NAS